

Keychain-Based Signatures for Securing BGP

Heng Yin, *Member, IEEE*, Bo Sheng, *Member, IEEE*,
Haining Wang, *Senior Member, IEEE*, and Jianping Pan, *Senior Member, IEEE*

Abstract—As a major component of Internet routing infrastructure, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is vulnerable to malicious attacks. While Secure BGP (S-BGP) provides a comprehensive framework to secure BGP, its high computational cost and low incremental deployment benefits seriously impede its wide usage in practice. Using a lightweight symmetric signature scheme, SPV is much faster than S-BGP. However, the speed boost comes at the price of prohibitively large signatures. Aggregated path authentication reduces the overhead of securing BGP in terms of both time and space, but the speed improvement is still limited by public key computation. In this paper, we propose a keychain-based signature scheme called *KC-x*. It has low CPU and memory overheads and provides strong incentive for incremental deployment on the Internet. As a generic framework, *KC-x* has the flexibility of using different signature algorithms, which can even co-exist in a hybrid deployment. We investigate two implementations of *KC-x*: *KC-RSA* based on RSA and *KC-MT* based on Merkle hash tree. Using real BGP workloads, our experimental results show that *KC-RSA* is as efficient as *SAS-V* (the most efficient software approach for aggregated path authentication), and *KC-MT* is even three times faster than *SPV* with 40% smaller signatures. Through the hybrid deployment of *KC-MT* and *KC-RSA*, *KC-x* can achieve both small signature and high processing rate for BGP speakers.

Index Terms—BGP, Keychain-based Signature, Secure Routing Protocol, Performance Optimization

I. INTRODUCTION

THE INTERNET is a global-scale and decentralized network comprised of numerous smaller inter-connected networks, each of which is an *autonomous system* (AS) under a single authority of administration. The routing process among ASes is called *interdomain routing*. The dominant interdomain routing protocol is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), and the current version, BGP-4, has been widely used for over a decade [1], [2]. However, due to its initial design for a “trusted” environment [3], BGP is vulnerable to a variety of malicious attacks. For instance, the communication between BGP peers is subject to wiretapping attacks, and a BGP speaker can be compromised to launch a blackhole attack. These attacks cause transmission of fictitious BGP messages,

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Heng Yin is with the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York 13244 (e-mail: heyin@syr.edu).

Bo Sheng is with the Department of Computer Science, University of Massachusetts Boston, Boston, MA 02125 (e-mail: shengbo@cs.umb.edu).

Haining Wang is with the Department of Computer Science, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187 (e-mail: hnw@cs.wm.edu).

Jianping Pan is with the Department of Computer Science, University of Victoria, BC, Canada (e-mail: pan@cs.uvic.ca).

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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF S-BGP, SAS-V, SPV, AND KC-X

	Incremental Benefit	Speed	Memory Usage
S-BGP	Weak	Lowest	> SAS-V
SAS-V	Weak	2X speedup	= KC-RSA
SPV	Strong	13X	largest
KC-RSA	Strong	2X	Smallest
KC-MT	Strong	34X	< SPV
KC-Hybrid	Strong	≥ SPV	< KC-MT

modification or replay of valid messages, or suppression of valid messages.

Many countermeasures [4]–[9] have been proposed for securing BGP. Among them, Secure BGP (S-BGP) [7], [10] is the first comprehensive framework for securing BGP. The S-BGP protocol and its associated architecture have been under consideration for standardization by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). However, due to its extensive use of certificates and asymmetric cryptography, S-BGP is costly in both computation and storage. Moreover, while S-BGP can be deployed incrementally, it provides little incremental benefit if the deployment is not contiguous. Using an efficient symmetric signature scheme (Merkle hash tree), SPV [6] is far more efficient than S-BGP in processing BGP UPDATE messages and provides stronger benefits for incremental deployment, but at the price of significantly greater storage demands, due to its much larger signature. Seeking for efficiency in both computation and storage, aggregated path authentication [9] has been proposed. Among its software options, the Sequential Aggregated Signature with bit Vector (SAS-V) yields the best performance. The improvement in computation, however, is limited, due to the use of asymmetric cryptography. By exploiting BGP’s natural path stability, Butler *et al.* [5] significantly reduced the computational cost of BGP path authentication, but at the expense of higher bandwidth cost. With the reasonable bandwidth cost, its performance improvement is still limited. In general, a viable BGP security scheme faces at least the following three challenges. First, since some BGP routers at certain times have very critical performance demand, it should provide sufficiently high processing speed. Second, with high processing speed, the storage and bandwidth overhead should be affordable. Third, it should provide incremental benefits even when not all routers participate. However, none of the existing countermeasures have addressed all these issues successfully.

This paper proposes a novel keychain-based ASPATH protection scheme, called *KC-x*, for securing BGP. The distinct feature of *KC-x* is that the keys used for signature generation and verification form a chain by themselves, resulting in a strong tie between signatures. Such a construction provides

strong benefits for incremental deployment. It can still provide some security protection even with a sparse deployment, and the protection is strengthened with the deployment of KC-x on more routers. As a generic signature framework, KC-x can be implemented using any efficient digital signature algorithm. Multiple implementations can co-exist in a hybrid deployment. Indeed, we implement two variants of KC-x using RSA (KC-RSA) and Merkle hash tree (KC-MT). On one hand, based on RSA-1024, KC-RSA achieves the same performance as SAS-V. Moreover, KC-RSA achieves aggregated signature without modifying the existing RSA implementation, which is required by SAS-V. On the other hand, KC-MT is much simpler in design and more efficient in both computation (i.e., a factor of 3 faster) and storage (i.e., 40% less) than SPV, because it constructs smaller trees and reuses them over multiple signatures.

After characterizing the overheads of KC-RSA and KC-MT, we evaluate their performance under three types of realistic BGP workloads: normal, pathological, and heavy. Note that KC-RSA and KC-MT can co-exist in a single BGP router. KC-Hybrid refers to the hybrid deployment of KC-RSA and KC-MT across the Internet, in which KC-MT is primarily used in the BGP routers having critical demand for performance, while KC-RSA plays a major role in the remaining routers. KC-Hybrid can achieve both small signature to save space, and high processing rate for handling a high volume of UPDATE messages. Overall, KC-x provides strong benefits for incremental deployment and satisfactory processing speed with modest storage cost and small bandwidth cost, making it a very promising BGP security mechanism for practical deployment. In comparison with S-BGP, SAS-V, and SPV, we summarize the advantages of KC-x in Table I.

The main contributions of this papers are as follows:

- We propose a new keychain-based signature scheme, *KC-x* for securing BGP. *KC-x* is efficient in computation and storage, and provides security benefits for incremental deployment.
- We investigate two implementations of this scheme, KC-RSA and KC-MT. Compared with other signature schemes, KC-RSA generates the smallest signatures and incurs modest computation overhead, whereas KC-MT is the fastest and generates modest-sized signatures.
- We present a hybrid deployment of KC-MT and KC-RSA, and show that in this hybrid deployment, we can achieve both small signature and high speed.
- We use recent real-world workloads to demonstrate the efficiency of *KC-x* and compare with other signature schemes. Particularly, we show that only *KC-x* is capable of dealing with the heavy workload, and all other schemes including SPV (the most efficient scheme prior to *KC-x*) fall short of processing speed.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the operation and security requirements of BGP. Section III details the design of *KC-x* for securing BGP. Section IV investigates two implementations of *KC-x*. Section V characterizes their computation and memory overheads, and evaluates their performance under the real BGP workloads. Section VI surveys related work. Finally, the paper concludes with Section VII.




Fig. 1. Overview of keychain-based signature scheme.

II. INTERDOMAIN ROUTING SECURITY

The primary function of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [1], [2] is to exchange network reachability information among BGP speakers. The goal of protecting BGP is to ensure the integrity, authenticity and availability of AS graphs. BGP involves two types of control information exchange: one is between peering speakers, and the other is relayed through a series of intermediate speakers. Protecting the peer exchange is just another variant of protecting data communications between any two endpoints, and existing security measures such as IPsec or SSL/TLS should apply. However, protecting the relayed routing exchange among BGP speakers is much more challenging: routing information is transformed when it is propagated through intermediate speakers, some of which may be misconfigured or even compromised. Therefore, BGP routing messages are vulnerable to a variety of malicious attacks, which can result in the injection of false routing messages and the suppression of valid ones. Researchers have studied possible attacks on BGP [3], [11], [12].

In this paper, we aim to propose an efficient protection scheme for BGP routing protocol. In particular, we focus on protecting ASPATH, by ensuring the integrity of BGP UPDATE messages. There are two kinds of falsification attacks on BGP UPDATE messages. One is the network layer reachability information (NLRI)¹ falsification attack, and the other is the ASPATH falsification attack. For example, black holing is one of the severe attacks using falsification, in which adversaries can either advertise a more specific prefix (i.e., NLRI falsification) or shorten ASPATH to “persuade” other routers to prefer the route otherwise not being preferred (i.e., ASPATH falsification).

Grayhole and colluding attacks are more advanced attacks. In grayhole attacks, a malicious BGP router may selectively drop traffic flowing through it. In colluding attacks, multiple compromised BGP routers may collude and exchange BGP messages and secrets through a tunnel. These colluding routers can cooperate to launch a blackhole attack and other sophisticated attacks. Unfortunately, these advanced attacks cannot be prevented solely by adopting a secure routing protocol. Thus, defending against such attacks is beyond the scope of this paper.

III. KEYCHAIN-BASED SIGNATURE

In this section, we first present the fundamental design of the proposed keychain-based signature scheme, and then

¹NLRI refers to the IP prefixes that the UPDATE message and path attributes pertain to.

TABLE II
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS

N_x	AS number
R_i	a BGP speaker
V_i	a bit vector of BGP speaker R_i
$H(M)$	hash value of the message M
$\{M\}_{K^-}$	the message M signed by using the private key K^-
$K^-(M)$	encrypt the message M by using the private key K^-
$K^+(M)$	decrypt the message M by using the public key K^+

discuss its security property. Finally, we describe how to estimate the computation overhead of handling a BGP UPDATE message.

A. Fundamental Design

In KC-x, each BGP speaker (R_i) generates a temporary key pair (t_i^+/t_i^-). As shown in Figure 1, the speaker R_i authorizes its next-hop speaker (R_{i+1}) and passes t_i^- to R_{i+1} in plaintext. The UPDATE message and the temporary public key t_i^+ are signed with the private key (t_{i-1}^-), which is authorized by its preceding speaker (R_{i-1}). In consequence, the above construction forms a chain of authorization. For each BGP speaker, instead of signing an UPDATE message directly with its own private key as S-BGP, the speaker signs the message using a temporary private key that is authorized by its preceding speaker along the ASPATH, and verifies the message by using temporary public keys of all previous speakers along the ASPATH. The only exception is that the speaker R_0 from the origin AS still signs ASPATH with its own private key that is authenticated by PKI, since there is no preceding speaker before R_0 . For convenience, a temporary key (private or public) is termed as an *attestation key* in the following discussion.

In more detail, we describe how KC-x protects an UPDATE message from the origin AS N_0 , and propagates it to AS N_i . The notations we use in the following discussion are listed in Table II. Here, K_i^+/K_i^- denotes the regular public/private key pair of the BGP speaker of AS N_i , and t_i^+/t_i^- denotes the attestation key pair generated by the speaker of AS N_i .

When the speaker R_0 of AS N_0 advertises some prefixes it owns, it signs the UPDATE message using its own private key K_0^- , which is the same as S-BGP. As proposed in [9], a bit vector denoted as V_0 here is included in the UPDATE message to amortize signature cost. In addition, it carries an attestation key pair t_0^+/t_0^- and signs the attestation public key t_0^+ using K_0^- . To improve performance, this attestation key pair can be generated offline or off-peak in advance, and the next-hop speaker can use it to sign multiple messages. The message that R_0 sends to R_1 is shown as follows:

$$R_0 \rightarrow R_1 : \{N_0; V_0; t_0^+\}_{K_0^-}, t_0^-$$

Upon receiving the above message, R_1 first verifies the signature using R_0 's public key K_0^+ . If R_1 decides to forward this message to its external peers, R_1 appends its own AS N_1 to the ASPATH. Similarly, R_1 also sends its attestation key pair t_1^+/t_1^- to the next-hop speaker. Meanwhile, R_1 uses R_0 's attestation private key to sign the UPDATE message. Like S-BGP, the speaker of KC-x carries all route attestations (RAs)

from the received message, and appends its own attestation. However, R_1 needs to remove R_0 's attestation private key t_0^- , from the message to maintain the secrecy between R_0 and R_1 . The message that R_1 sends to R_2 is shown as follows:

$$R_1 \rightarrow R_2 : \{N_0; V_0; t_0^+\}_{K_0^-}, \\ \{N_0, N_1; V_1; t_1^+\}_{t_0^-}, t_1^-$$

Generally speaking, the message received by speaker R_i ($0 < i \leq n$) has the following format:

$$R_{i-1} \rightarrow R_i : \{N_0; V_0; t_0^+\}_{K_0^-}, \\ \{N_0, N_1; V_1; t_1^+\}_{t_0^-}, \\ \dots \\ \{N_0, \dots, N_{i-1}; V_{i-1}; t_{i-1}^+\}_{t_{i-2}^-}, t_{i-1}^-$$

Upon receiving the above message, R_i first verifies the received RAs sequentially in the order of that they are signed—one RA is verified using the attestation public key included in the preceding RA. When forwarding the UPDATE message, R_i appends its AS N_i to the ASPATH, including the next-hop AS N_{i+1} and its attestation public key t_i^+ in the RA, and signs the RA using R_{i-1} 's attestation private key t_{i-1}^- .

The attestation private key t_i^- needs to be protected from eavesdropping, especially for multi-hop BGP peering connections. Conventional security schemes such as IPsec and SSL/TLS can be used to ensure the secrecy of attestation private keys.

Note that the attestation keys are sent in every UPDATE message. This design simplifies the handling of the cases in which some next-hop speakers are down and then up, because these speakers can always receive the refreshed attestation keys from the latest UPDATE message. A straightforward optimization could be sending attestation key pairs only if necessary to save bandwidth consumption. Since the extra bandwidth consumed by attestation keys is small, we do not include such an optimization in the paper.

B. Integration with BGP

Like the other secure BGP routing protocols, e.g., S-BGP and SPV, the authentication information in KC-x is transmitted in an optional transitive path attribute in the UPDATE message.

KC-x employs the similar approaches as S-BGP to handle route aggregation and expiration. When generating an aggregated route from several individual routes, a KC-x speaker needs to attach the authentication of all individual routes to the aggregated one. Route announcements and withdrawals are vulnerable to replay attacks, in which a BGP speaker replays a previously-heard UPDATE message. To defend against replay attacks, KC-x incorporates into the signature an expiration date, after which the corresponding route is no longer valid. When the route is about to expire, the original speaker must re-announce this route with a new signature.

C. Security Analysis

We first discuss the security property of KC-x in full deployment and partial deployment respectively. Then we talk about the incremental deployment of KC-x.

1) *Full Deployment*: ASPATH falsification is infeasible, when all BGP speakers are deployed with KC-x. Even if an adversary compromises one or more BGP routers and steals their attestation private keys, she cannot forge ASPATH with any adverse effect. Recall that KC-x incorporates bit vectors to reduce sign operations. For bit vectors to work properly, each BGP speaker pre-establishes an ordered list of its next-hop speakers and distributes the neighbor list to the other speakers via the speaker's X.509 certificate. Therefore, even if an adversary steals one or more attestation private keys, the forged ASPATH still has to be "valid" in the sense that for any consecutive two ASes in it, the latter speaker must be in the former's neighbor list.

2) *Partial Deployment*: When only part of BGP speakers are deployed with KC-x, ASPATH falsification is feasible in a very limited way.

$$\dots N_{i-1}, X_{(i-1,1)}, X_{(i-1,2)}, \dots N_i, X_{(i,1)}, X_{(i,2)}, \dots, X_{(i,m)}, M$$

Consider the above generalized ASPATH, in which N_j is KC-x capable speaker, $X_{(i,j)}$ is legacy, and M is malicious. Since M does not know the attestation private key of N_{i-1} , she cannot modify and remove any AS number before and including N_i . However, she can arbitrarily modify the portion from $X_{(i,1)}$ to $X_{(i,m)}$ inclusively, as long as the AS number following N_i satisfies N_i 's bit vector. Generally speaking, the room for the adversary to forge an ASPATH is between the preceding KC-x capable AS to itself. With the increased deployment of KC-x capable speakers, such a security hole becomes smaller. Therefore, KC-x provides strong incentive for incremental deployment.

3) *Incremental Deployment*: We imagine that only a small portion of BGP speakers are deployed with KC-x at beginning and gradually more and more BGP speakers participate. From the above discussion, we know that the room for ASPATH falsification attacks depends on the gap of two adjacent KC-x capable speakers. Therefore, an evenly scattered deployment provides better overall protection than a clustered or uneven deployment. For example, " $N_1, X_1, N_2, X_2, N_3, X_3$ " is better than " $N_1, N_2, N_3, X_1, X_2, X_3$ ", where N_i is a KC-x capable router and X_i is not.

D. Computational Overhead

When receiving an incoming BGP UPDATE message, a BGP speaker needs to validate this message, i.e., check the authenticity of NLRI and ASPATH. The authenticity of NLRI is validated by matching with the cached AA (Address Attestation) information without cryptographic computation. The validation of ASPATH involves a certain number of signature verifications, which depend on the number of ASes in the ASPATH. Note that the first signature is different from the following signatures, because it is generated using the originating speaker's private key K_0^- . In the implementation, K_0^+/K_0^- is an RSA key pair, and the verification of the first signature is lightweight, as we will show in Section IV-A. In addition, to avoid unnecessary overhead, KC-x only validates those UPDATE messages that cause routing table changes, as S-BGP does [13].

When propagating an UPDATE message to the next-hop speakers, the BGP speaker appends its own AS number into

the ASPATH and signs the UPDATE message. Due to the use of a bit vector, only one signing operation is required.

When signing an UPDATE message, the speaker needs to attach an attestation key pair for the next-hop speakers. Since the generation of attestation key pairs can be performed offline in advance, its computation overhead is negligible in processing UPDATE messages. Therefore, the estimated computation overhead of handling an outgoing UPDATE message is given below:

$$C \approx \text{Length}(\text{ASPATH}) \times \text{Time}(\text{verify}) + \text{Time}(\text{sign}) \quad (1)$$

IV. TWO IMPLEMENTATIONS

We apply two signature algorithms, RSA and Merkle hash tree, to the design of KC-x. We call these two implementations KC-RSA and KC-MT, respectively.

A. KC-RSA

1) *DSA vs. RSA*: S-BGP chooses DSA rather than RSA to protect UPDATE messages mainly due to its smaller signature. Specifically, RSA-1024 yields a 128-byte signature, whereas DSA yields only a 40-byte signature. In addition, DSA supports pre-computation, which greatly reduces the cost of signing operation. On the other hand, while RSA is about twofold slower than DSA in signing with the same key length, it is one order of magnitude faster in verifying. In a simple experiment, in which we use a Pentium-4 1.8GHz CPU, RSA-1024 takes 6.8ms in signing but only 0.35ms in verifying. By contrast, DSA takes 3.8ms (0.03ms with pre-computation) in signing, but 4.6ms in verifying. Assuming that each route contains an average of 3.7 ASes [14], RSA-1024 is still 2-fold faster than DSA-1024 even when pre-computation for DSA is enabled.

2) *Signature Aggregation*: Zhao, et al. proposed two schemes, general aggregate signature and sequential aggregate signature, to aggregate multiple signatures into one signature [9]. The signature aggregation reduces the length of UPDATE messages and memory consumption of routing tables. Although these two schemes can also be applied to KC-RSA, they require the modification of the existing RSA signature algorithm. In this paper, we propose a new scheme of signature aggregation that eliminates this requirement. The proposed scheme leverages the exclusive-OR operation and is termed as *XOR-ed aggregate signature*.

We still use the previous example to illustrate how XOR-ed aggregate signature works. A new symbol S_i denotes the signature generated by R_i . There is no change for R_0 , which sends S_0 and its attestation private key t_0^- as follows.

$$S_0 = K_0^- (H(N_0; V; t_0^+)) \quad (2)$$

For each following R_i , instead of appending S_i to the existing sequence of signatures S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{i-1} , R_i incorporates the preceding signature S_{i-1} into its own signature S_i , which is shown as follows:

$$S_i = t_{i-1}^- (S_{i-1} \oplus H(N_0, \dots, N_i; V; t_i^+)) \quad (3)$$

R_{i+1} verifies S_i in the following steps: (1) decrypt S_i : $t_{i-1}^+(S_i) = S_{i-1} \oplus H(N_0, \dots, N_i; V; t_i^+)$; (2) compute the




Fig. 2. An example of HORS signature. A hash tree with 8 leaf nodes is derived from a secret value, and two leaf nodes are disclosed for each signature. The filled circles denote the disclosed values in a signature. Using these values, a verifier can recalculate the root value.

hash value of the message: $h = H(N_0, \dots, N_i; V; t_i^+)$; (3) recover S_{i-1} : $t_{i-1}^+(S_i) \oplus h = S_{i-1} \oplus H(N_0, \dots, N_i; V; t_i^+) \oplus H(N_0, \dots, N_i; V; t_i^+) = S_{i-1}$; (4) $i = i - 1$, if $i \neq 0$, go to step (1); (5) use R_0 's public key K_0^+ to verify S_0 . All the signatures are correct only if S_0 passes the verification. Since exclusive-OR is very lightweight, the cost of additional exclusive-OR operations induced by XOR-ed aggregate signature is negligible.

B. KC-MT

Invented by Ralph Merkle, a Merkle hash tree [15] creates secure signatures based on hash functions (e.g. SHA-1). Due to the use of lightweight hash functions, Merkle-tree-based signature scheme is far more efficient than those based on asymmetric crypto-systems. The basic Merkle-tree-based signature works as follows: Alice populates n leaf nodes from a secret and builds a hash tree; when signing a message, Alice hashes the message and maps it into a leaf node, and then discloses the leaf node accompanying with some corresponding intermediate nodes to Bob; after receiving the leaf node and the intermediate nodes, Bob can compute the root value, and compare it with the value given by Alice. Since the chance of a forged message mapping to the same leaf node as a legitimate message is $\frac{1}{n}$, we need a large hash tree to achieve high security.

To reduce tree size, a few variants have been proposed. The HORS signature [16] is one of them, which can achieve fast verification with a smaller hash tree. Instead of disclosing one leaf node, the HORS signature discloses m leaf nodes for each signature. There is only a chance of $1/\binom{n}{m}$ that two messages yield the same signature. Figure 2 shows an example of ($n = 8, m = 2$).

KC-MT makes use of HORS signatures in conjunction with a hash tree. For a Merkle hash tree of KC-MT, the secret used to populate all leaf nodes is treated as a private key, and the root value of the tree is a public key. According to the fundamental design of KC-x, a speaker R_i generates an attestation key pair by building a Merkle hash tree based on a secret t_i^- (i.e. attestation private key) and calculates the root value t_i^+ (i.e. attestation public key). It then signs the ASPATH and t_i^+ using the hash tree derived from the secret t_{i-1}^- given by its preceding speaker R_{i-1} , and then forwards the signed message and t_i^- to the next-hop speaker.

For a Merkle hash tree, security degrades when more signatures are generated, because more leaf nodes are disclosed.

SPV chooses ($n = 256, m = 6$) to ensure the forgery probability of 2^{-11} after 15 signatures. Similarly in KC-MT, we limit the maximum number (Σ) of signatures a single tree can yield. We will discuss the selection of n and m and the corresponding maximum number of signatures in Section V-A1. To ensure that one tree signs at most Σ messages, the issuing speaker generates a new attestation key pair after sending Σ UPDATE messages.

1) *KC-MT vs. SPV*: SPV is also based on Merkle hash tree [6]. Based on a different security construction, KC-MT is simpler in nature than SPV in three aspects. First, in SPV, the concept of epoch is introduced to thwart repeatable and predictable fraud. Adding an epoch number to each hash operation makes the probability of forgery independent between epochs. The costs are two-fold: 1) one more hierarchy has to be constructed in the Merkle tree; 2) more values are included into the signature, and more hash operations are required to authenticate an ASPATH. In contrast, KC-MT prevents this attack implicitly by its inherent rekeying mechanism. That is, in KC-MT, each speaker independently builds a tree, authorizes its next-hop speaker to use it, and periodically reconstructs the tree.

In addition, the design of SPV is vulnerable to multi-path truncation attack, in which a single-ASN private key obtained from a shorter ASPATH can be used to truncate a longer ASPATH from the same origin. To counter such an attack, SPV introduces an additional level to the ASPATH authenticator, and degrades private values to semi-private values gradually along the path. Obviously, this induces design complexity and extra performance overhead to SPV. In contrast, KC-MT is not vulnerable to this kind of attack, and no additional protection is needed.

The design simplicity of KC-MT brings performance benefits. The costs of both verifying and signing are reduced, as compared to SPV. The overhead reduction of verifying lies in fewer hash operations: for each AS in the ASPATH, KC-MT needs only to compute the root value of each small tree, whereas SPV needs more hash operations to compute the multi-epoch public key from the single-ASN public keys and several other intermediate values. The cost reduction of signing is achieved by caching the intermediate values during the first signing operation, and then the number of hash operations for the subsequent signing operations on the same tree can be greatly reduced. The number of cached trees can be determined by AS degree, which follows a power law distribution. As shown in [17], 90% of ASes have less than 10 neighboring ASes. Even for the ASes (about 0.01%) with over 1000 neighbors, only about 1MB buffer is required to cache all trees with 512 leaf nodes. By contrast, the Merkle tree in SPV is substantially larger, and different origin BGP speakers use different trees. Thus, it would be unaffordable for SPV to cache all trees. Note that as mentioned in Section III, attestation key pairs for next-hop speakers can be generated offline. Even for online computation, its small cost is further amortized over Σ outgoing UPDATE messages. So, the cost of key generation is negligible.




Fig. 3. **Hybrid deployment on BGP speakers in the Internet.** The BGP routers serving high volume of BGP messages use KC-MT to sign UPDATE messages, while the other BGP routers use KC-RSA. By exploiting benefits of these two algorithms, the hybrid deployment can achieve faster speed in processing UPDATE message and smaller footprint in storage and transmission.

C. Hybrid Deployment

KC-MT is very fast but has relatively large signatures, whereas KC-RSA yields very small signature but is slower than KC-MT. Here we present a hybrid deployment approach to achieving both small signature and high processing rate.

In the hybrid deployment, both KC-RSA and KC-MT are installed on a BGP router, and hence the router knows how to verify signatures of both KC-RSA and KC-MT. In addition, it chooses either KC-RSA or KC-MT to be the primary for signing UPDATE messages. The routers requiring high processing rate can choose KC-MT to be the primary, while the other routers may choose KC-RSA to sign messages. Figure 3 illustrates such a layout.

For the hybrid deployment to work properly, when a speaker chooses one algorithm as the primary, its preceding speaker has to issue the corresponding attestation key pair for that algorithm. Since the amortized cost of key generation for either KC-RSA or KC-MT is negligible, it is feasible for the preceding speaker to issue both kinds of key pairs and let the receiver choose which one to use. This greatly simplifies the hybrid deployment over the Internet.


As we will show in Section V, the speed of verifying a KC-RSA signature is in the same order of magnitude as that of KC-MT. Thus, with the hybrid deployment, the performance of handling an UPDATE message on a router with KC-MT as the primary will be comparable to that of pure KC-MT deployment. The benefit, however, is much smaller footprint of signatures, due to the signature aggregation in KC-RSA.

V. EVALUATION


In this section, we quantify the computation and memory overheads of the keychain-based schemes, which include KC-RSA, KC-MT, and the hybrid of these two, and compare them with those of S-BGP, SAS-V, and SPV under real traces.

A. CPU Overhead


To accurately assess the computation overheads of these different schemes, we implement the HORS signature algorithm using AES [18], [19], and conduct a series of experiments on a modest PC with a Pentium-4 1.8GHZ CPU. We characterize the computation overhead of each individual operation as signing, verification, and key generation. Then, we evaluate



(a)



(b)



(c)

Fig. 4. Operation cost of KC-MT with different (n, m) .

and compare the BGP performance with different protection mechanisms under real-world BGP workloads. Before presenting the experiment results of overhead estimation, we first detail the parameter setting of Merkle tree in KC-MT. This is because the operation overhead of KC-MT is highly dependent upon the parameter setting of the Merkle tree.

TABLE III
SPEED OF INDIVIDUAL OPERATIONS (IN μs)

	S-BGP	SPV	SAS-V	KC-RSA	KC-MT
Sign	3,802/30	703	6,800	6,800	90
Verify	4,607	191	350	350	111

1) *Merkle-tree Configuration*: To achieve a forgery probability around $p = 2^{-11}$ after yielding 15 signatures, SPV selects $n = 256$ and $m = 6$ [6]. For KC-MT, by caching the intermediate values of the first signing, we can significantly reduce the overhead of subsequent signing operations. Therefore, KC-MT may choose different (n, m) to run even faster and yield smaller signature without degrading its security, i.e., achieving the same level of security as SPV. With different selections of (n, m) , the experiment results of KC-MT are shown in Figure 4.

There are five factors affecting the CPU overhead of KC-MT, including initial signing ($S1$), subsequent signing ($S2$), verification (V), and the maximal number of signatures (Σ). The average signing cost S is:

$$S = S1/\Sigma + (1 - 1/\Sigma) \times S2 \quad (4)$$

Since the cost of key generation is amortized over Σ messages, according to Equations 1 and 4, the overall computation cost of handling one UPDATE message is:

$$C = \text{Length}(\text{ASPATH}) \times V + S1/\Sigma + (1 - 1/\Sigma) \times S2 \quad (5)$$

Figure 4(a) shows the overhead breakdown of the first three factors and the overall cost, while Figure 4(b) shows Σ the maximal number of signatures, which a Merkle tree of (n, m) needs to issue, to ensure the same forgery probability (around $p = 2^{-11}$) as SPV².

The overhead of initial signing is proportional to n , since most of the internal values of the tree need to be computed for the intermediate values required by the signature. For the subsequent signing operations, as the internal values have been cached, its computational overhead is substantially decreased (less than $50\mu s$). Thus, considering the number of signing operations on the same Merkle tree, we compute the average overhead of signing, which is as low as $73\mu s$ when $n = 512$ and $m = 4$.

As shown in Figure 4(a), the overhead of verification is between $103\mu s$ for $(1024, 2)$ and $197\mu s$ for $(1024, 6)$. Note that the total CPU overhead of KC-MT for handling an UPDATE message is under the assumption that the average length of ASPATH is 3.7. In our experiments, the parameter setting (n, m) with the lowest total CPU overhead is $(512, 3)$. In addition to processing speed, we also need to consider memory consumption of KC-MT and balance these two metrics. Figure 4(c) shows the dynamics of signature size with different Merkle-tree configurations, in which a Merkle tree of $(512, 3)$ yields the second smallest signature. Hence, we set KC-MT as $n = 512$ and $m = 3$.

²Here we ensure the same forgery probability as SPV just for fair comparison. With different parameters, KC-MT can definitely provide higher-level security protection.

2) *Individual Operation Cost*: The individual overheads of signing, verification, and key generation, with respect to S-BGP, SAS-V, SPV, KC-RSA, and KC-MT, are listed in Table III. Without pre-computation in DSA, the signing cost of S-BGP is $3,802\mu s$. However, it is only $30\mu s$ with pre-computation enabled. To be fair in comparison, the signature amortization based on the bit vector is assumed to be available for all candidates because it is compatible with all of them and easy to implement. We also assume pre-computation in DSA is enabled. To simplify evaluation, the signature cache is not considered, which is also fair since it causes the same effect to all of them.

Based on the above assumptions, we apply Equation 1 to assess the performance of all schemes. Here we still assume that the average ASPATH length is 3.7. We observe that S-BGP is the slowest. SAS-V and KC-RSA are a factor of 2.2 faster than S-BGP, while SPV and KC-MT are 12 and 34 fold faster than S-BGP, respectively. Compared to SPV, KC-MT is about 3 fold faster. In the hybrid deployment, for a router with KC-MT being its primary, even in the worst case that all signatures in ASPATH are of KC-RSA, it is 12.3 fold faster than S-BGP, and still slightly faster than SPV.

3) *Performance under Real Workloads*: With the knowledge of individual operation cost for S-BGP, SPV, SAS-V, KC-RSA, and KC-MT, we further evaluate the overall performance under real workloads. One important metric is the delay of handling an UPDATE message at a BGP router, which includes the processing time and the waiting time. The delay is crucial to the convergence speed of inter-domain routing over the Internet.

The workloads are obtained from UPDATE message traces from *routeviews* [20], in which the *routeviews* routers record the outgoing UPDATE messages of the observed ASes they peer with. From the knowledge of the workloads and the cryptographic operation cost, we can derive the distribution of delayed outgoing UPDATE messages caused by each BGP protection scheme.

We choose three typical workloads to represent normal, pathological, and heavy workloads, respectively. For normal workload, we select the trace of a router (AS 3277) on Jun 1st, 2005. This trace represents the average traffic load among most available BGP routers. For pathological workload, we choose the trace of a router (AS 7911) on Jan 24th, 2003, when SQL worms were spreading quickly across the Internet. The chosen trace has the maximum number of UPDATE messages among all observed BGP routers during that period. Finally, we select a constantly heavy workload from AS 2914 on Dec 25th, 2008, which has the highest workload in *routeviews*'s database in recent two years. The statistics of these three traces are listed in Table IV. The distributions of UPDATE requests are extracted from these three traces and shown in Figures 5(a), (b), and (c). We have two observations: 1) UPDATE messages are sent in burst even under normal condition, because of the rate limiting mechanism in BGP [2]; and 2) the volume and average rate of heavy workload are significantly higher than those of pathological workload, whereas the pathological workload is more bursty (i.e., its maximum rate is higher).

Figures 6 (a) and (b) illustrate the distributions of delayed UPDATE messages under the normal condition caused by




Fig. 5. Request distributions in normal, pathologic, and heavy traffic

different security schemes. Since the traffic load is relatively light, SPV, SAS-V, and our keychain-based schemes (KC-RSA and KC-MT) can handle all UPDATE messages within one second. As shown in Figure 6 (b), the distribution of outgoing messages exactly matches the one in Figure 5 (a), due to the resolution of one second. For S-BGP, some peak bursty traffic exceeds the processing capacity of DSA, leading to noticeable delays as shown in Figure 6 (a). With respect to different BGP secure mechanisms, we summarize their average and maximum delay times under normal condition in the second

TABLE IV
CHARACTERISTICS OF TRAFFIC TRACES

	Normal	Pathological	Heavy
AS Number	3277	7911	2914
Date	06/01/05	01/24/03	12/25/08
Duration(s)	871s	876s	870s
Total Announcements	1121	88777	508058
Average Rate(/s)	1.29	101.34	583.97
Maximum Rate(/s)	117	6764	5011

TABLE V
DELAY (AVG/MAX) IN NORMAL/HEAVY/PATHOLOGICAL TRAFFIC (IN s)

	Normal	Pathological	Heavy
S-BGP	0.60 / 3.20	515.84 / 952.83	2927.98 / 5635.07
SPV	0.04 / 0.22	4.16 / 14.09	34.11 / 85.34
KC-RSA	0.18 / 1.04	251.9 / 454.30	1659.71 / 3077.80
KC-MT	0.02 / 0.09	0.81 / 3.22	0.20 / 1.70

column of Table V. In the average cases, all schemes can handle an UPDATE message within one second. However, in the worst cases, the delay time of S-BGP increases to 3.633s while the others are still less than one second.

Figures 6 (c)-(f) show the results of different protection schemes under the pathological condition. As shown in Table IV and Figure 5 (b), the average message arrival rate of the pathological traffic is two orders of magnitude larger than that of the normal traffic, and the peak has 4000~7000 arrivals per second and lasts for 3 to 4 minutes. Under this extremely bursty workload, S-BGP, SAS-V and KC-RSA reach their full processing capacity. As Figure 6 (c) shows, on average S-BGP can only process about 60 messages per second, while SAS-V and KC-RSA can handle 120 messages per second, shown in Figure 6 (d). Such low processing capacities of these three schemes cause unacceptably large delays up to 21 minutes. Using the efficient HORS signature based on Merkle tree, SPV, shown in Figure 6 (e), can process about 800 messages per second, while KC-MT, shown in Figure 6 (f), is able to process around 2,500 messages per second. Both schemes have some idle time during the peak period, and they can digest the bursty traffic within a few seconds. Due to the accumulation effect of highly bursty traffic under the pathological workload, the average and maximum delays of KC-MT are a factor of 5 less than those of SPV. In the third column of Table V, we summarize the average and maximum delays of different secure schemes under the pathological condition.

Figures 6 (g)-(j) show the results under the heavy workload. This constantly heavy workload is completely beyond the capabilities of S-BGP, SAS-V and KC-RSA. Even SPV reaches its full potential. It takes SPV up to 86 seconds to digest such constantly heavy workload. By contrast, KC-MT can handle this heavy workload well (within 2 seconds). In the hybrid deployment of KC-x, the performance of a router with KC-MT as primary is between SPV and KC-MT.

B. Memory Consumption

In practice, BGP routers have limited memory space. A BGP security mechanism that yields relatively large signatures could easily exceed the memory limit of many BGP routers, impeding its wide deployment. Therefore, memory consumption is another important metric for evaluating BGP




Fig. 6. Outgoing UPDATE message rates under real-world workloads with various secure protections.

routing security mechanisms. Since the size of signature is the dominant factor in determining the memory consumption, we focus on the memory requirement of signatures.

To estimate the memory consumption in real scenarios, we select several typical BGP routers from [21]. Then, we compute the memory consumption of signatures in different BGP security schemes under these real routers' working condition. The results are listed in Table VI. Among these four schemes,

KC-RSA and SAS-V are the most economical. Independent of the length of ASPATH, the size of their signatures are only 128 bytes. In all three selected BGP routers, the memory consumption of KC-RSA is less than 26MB. Using DSA, S-BGP yields 40-byte signature for each AS in the ASPATH. Thus, S-BGP consumes slightly more memory than KC-RSA, depending on the average length of ASPATH. SPV and KC-MT also yield one signature for each AS, but signature size

TABLE VI
MEMORY CONSUMPTION OF SIGNATURES (IN MB)

ASN	RIB entries	ASPATH	S-BGP	SPV	KC-RSA & SAS-V	KC-MT	Hybrid 1:1 (2:1)
1221	211721	3.555	28.7	253	25.8	152.5	102.1 (76.7)
4637	163918	3.356	21	185	20	111.5	75.7 (57.2)
7660	167288	4.46	28.5	250.8	20.4	151.2	96 (70.8)

may vary with different message content. In our implementation, on average, the Merkle tree of (256,6) selected by SPV yields 353-byte signatures, while the tree of (512,3) selected by KC-MT yields 213-byte signatures. Thus, SPV is the most expensive, consuming as much as 253MB memory. Due to smaller signatures, the memory consumption of KC-MT is only 60% of that of SPV. The hybrid deployment of KC-RSA and KC-MT can further reduce the total size of signatures. Assume that on ASPATHs, the ratio of signatures of KC-RSA to KC-MT is 1:1 or 2:1. The memory consumption of the hybrid deployment is up to 102.1MB and 76.7MB.

VI. RELATED WORK

A great deal of research has been conducted to secure BGP protocol. We refer interested readers to the following surveys on security issues and solutions for BGP [22], [23]. The Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP) [7], [10] was proposed by BBN to provide strong security for BGP. S-BGP relies on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to assign the ownership of an IP prefix to an AS, and to authenticate the identity of a BGP router. To protect the ASPATH from modification and truncation, each *enroute* BGP speaker verifies *route attestations* issued by previous ASes in the ASPATH via their public keys, and when propagating this message, appends its own AS number, and creates its own *route attestation* via its private key. However, due to public key cryptography, S-BGP is expensive in both computation and storage [13], [14], making it inefficient in realistic deployment.

Several efforts have been made to improve the performance of S-BGP. Secure Path Vector (SPV) [6] is designed to use symmetric cryptographic mechanisms to provide integrity protection. While the prefix authentication still relies on PKI, the route attestation is realized by employing a lightweight symmetric one-time signature in conjunction with a Merkle hash tree. SPV is claimed to be a factor of 22 faster than S-BGP, at the price of significantly high storage demand. Moreover, the fairly complicated design makes it challenging to implement and deploy SPV in practice.

Still using public key cryptography, Zhao *et al.* [9] applied several optimizations to improve the processing speed and reduce the storage cost of S-BGP, by combining the time-efficient scheme of signature amortization with the space-efficient techniques of aggregate signatures. However, the performance improvement is still limited by the expensive public key computation.

By exploiting the stability of path advertisement, Butler *et al.* [5] investigated several optimization solutions to amortize cryptographic operations over many verifications. However, the performance improvement is achieved at the expense of higher bandwidth cost. For example, the all path scheme has the biggest processing speed gain (97.3% load reduction), but

with prohibitively high bandwidth overhead (as much as 139 megabytes per minute). The origin path scheme, the second fastest, has limited improvement (about 86.3% reduction), with reasonable bandwidth cost. This approach can be applied in conjunction with the other schemes, including KC-x, to further improve the performance.

All the above schemes, including ours, assume a global and public-key infrastructure (PKI). However, building such an infrastructure is challenging. Some efforts have been made to address this issue, and they are complementary to our approach. Pretty Secure BGP (psBGP) [24] represents a new solution for prefix authentication via the construction of a decentralized authentication system, rather than a centralized infrastructure employed by S-BGP. Each AS maintains a *prefix assertion list* (PAL), which includes the address ownership assertions of the local AS and its peers. The prefix information is validated by checking the consistency of PALs of the peers around the origin. Recently, Grassroots-PKI [25] has been proposed as an evolutionary approach to enabling the incremental construction of a global PKI.

Independent of S-BGP, a few completely different protection schemes have been proposed. Secure Origin BGP (soBGP) [26] provides a secure registry mechanism against which a BGP speaker can check the authenticity of an originating AS and the validity of an ASPATH. Interdomain Route Validation (IRV) [27] proposes to setup an IRV server in each AS responsible for validating the route information, and the local IRV server queries other relevant IRV servers for the validity when necessary. “Listen and Whisper” [8] is a lightweight protection with less guarantee. “Listen” detects invalid routes in the data plane by detecting incomplete TCP connections, while “whisper” uncovers invalid route announcements by detecting inconsistency among multiple UPDATE messages originating from the same AS. Pretty Good BGP [28] is another lightweight protection scheme: its essence is to detect suspicious advertisements using historical hints, and delay the propagation of them. Suspicious origin ASes are temporarily assigned a low preference, and suspicious sub-prefixes are temporarily ignored. In addition, there is an approach [29] using centralized servers with identity-based cryptography and encrypted search to verify received BGP UPDATE messages.

VII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we present KC-x, a keychain-based security mechanism for securing BGP. KC-x builds a chain of key authorization along an ASPATH. Such a key chain creates a strong tie between the BGP speakers along the ASPATH. Hence, KC-x provides strong incremental benefits for partial deployment over the Internet. Moreover, as a generic security mechanism, KC-x can be realized using any efficient digital signature algorithm, and support the hybrid deployment. To

demonstrate this approach, we investigate and evaluate two implementations: KC-RSA and KC-MT. We use real-world BGP workloads to demonstrate the efficiency of this new signature scheme and compare with other schemes, including S-BGP, SAS-V, and SPV. We believe that the inherent simple design, easy implementation, strong benefits for incremental deployment, high processing speed, and modest memory usage will make KC-x a very promising BGP security mechanism for wide deployment over the Internet.

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
Heng Yin is an assistant professor in the department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York. He received the PhD degree in Computer Science from the College of William and Mary in 2009. His research interests lie in computer and network security. He is a member of the IEEE.



Bo Sheng is an assistant professor in the department of Computer Science at University of Massachusetts Boston. He received his Ph.D. in computer science from the College of William and Mary in 2010. His research interests include wireless networks and embedded systems with an emphasis on efficiency and security issues.



Haining Wang is an Associate Professor of Computer Science at the College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA. He received his Ph.D. in Computer Science and Engineering from the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor in 2003. His research interests lie in the area of security, networking systems, and distributed computing. He is a senior member of IEEE.



Jianping Pan is currently an assistant professor of computer science at the University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada. He received his Bachelor's and PhD degrees in computer science from Southeast University, Nanjing, China, and he did his postdoctoral research at the University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. He also worked at Fujitsu Labs and NTT Labs. His area of specialization is computer networks and distributed systems, and his current research interests include protocols for advanced networking, performance analysis of networked systems, and applied network security. He is a senior member of the ACM and a senior member of the IEEE.