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CSCI 454/554 Computer and Network Security

Topic 8.3 SSL/TLS

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Outline

1. Overview
2. The SSL Record Protocol
3. The SSL Handshake and Other Protocols

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Overview of SSL

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Reminder: What Layer?

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Protocols

- Goal: application independent security
 - Originally for HTTP, but now used for many applications
 - Each application has an assigned TCP port, e.g., https (HTTP over SSL) uses port 443
- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
 - the de facto standard for web-based security
 - v3 was developed with public review
- Transport Layer Security (TLS)
 - TLS v1.0 very close to SSL v3.1

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
Protocol over SSL/TLS

Keyword	Decimal	Description
nsiops	261/tcp	IIOP Name Service over TLS/SSL
https	443/tcp	http protocol over TLS/SSL
ddm-ssl	448/tcp	DDM-SSL
smtps	465/tcp	smtp protocol over TLS/SSL
nntp	563/tcp	nntp protocol over TLS/SSL
ssh	614/tcp	SSH
ldaps	636/tcp	ldap protocol over TLS/SSL
ftps-data	989/tcp	ftp protocol, data, over TLS/SSL
ftps	990/tcp	ftp, control, over TLS/SSL
telnet	992/tcp	telnet protocol over TLS/SSL
imaps	993/tcp	imap4 protocol over TLS/SSL
ircs	994/tcp	irc protocol over TLS/SSL
pop3s	995/tcp	pop3 protocol over TLS/SSL

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SSL Architecture

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The diagram illustrates the SSL architecture as a layered stack. At the top is 'HTTP and other applications'. Below this is the SSL layer, which is divided into four sub-protocols: 'SSL Handshake Protocol', 'SSL Change Cipher Protocol', 'SSL Alert Protocol', and 'SSL API'. Underneath these is the 'SSL Record Protocol'. The next layer is 'TCP', followed by 'IP'. Vertical dots below the IP layer indicate that other lower-level protocols may exist.

- Relies on TCP for reliable communication

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Architecture (Cont'd)

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- **Handshake protocol:** establishment of a session key
- **Change Cipher protocol:** start using the previously-negotiated encryption / message authentication
- **Alert protocol:** notification (warnings or fatal exceptions)
- **Record protocol:** protected (encrypted, authenticated) communication between client and server

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SSL Services

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- Peer authentication
- Negotiation of security parameters
- Generation / distribution of session keys
- Data confidentiality
- Data integrity

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Connections and Sessions

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- **SSL Session**
 - an association between peers
 - created through a handshake, negotiates security parameters, can be **long-lasting**
- **SSL Connection**
 - a type of service (i.e., an application) between a client and a server
 - **transient**
- Multiple connections can be part of a single session

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Session Parameters

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- Session ID
- X.509 public-key **certificate** of peer
- **Compression** algorithm to use
- **Cipher** specification: encryption algorithm, message digest, etc.
- **Master (session) secret:** **48-byte** (384 bits) secret negotiated between peers

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Connection Parameters

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- Server and client **nonces**
- Server and client **authentication keys**
- Server and client **encryption keys**
- Server and client **initialization vectors**
- Current message **sequence number**

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Ciphers Supported by SSL

- DES+HMAC/SHA-1
- 3DES+HMAC/SHA-1
- RC4+MD5
- RC2+MD5
- +others

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The SSL Record Protocol

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Protocol Steps

1. Fragment data stream into **records**
 - each with a maximum length of 2^{14} (=16K) bytes
2. **Compress** each record
3. Create **message authentication code** for each record
4. **Encrypt** each record

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Steps... (cont'd)

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SSL Record Format

Record Type	SSL Version	Payload Length
Application Data (optionally compressed)		
Optional MAC (16 or 20 bytes)		

Encrypted

- There is, unfortunately, some version number silliness between v2 and v3; see text for (ugly) details

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Possible Record "Payloads"

1 byte 1	1 byte 3 bytes ≥ 0 bytes Type Length Content
(a) Change Cipher Spec Protocol	(c) Handshake Protocol
1 byte 1 byte Level Alert	≥ 1 byte OpaqueContent
(b) Alert Protocol	(d) Other Upper-Layer Protocol (e.g., HTTP)



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SSL Handshake Protocol

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- ## Phases of Protocol
- I. Establish security capabilities
 - version of SSL to use
 - cipher + parameters to use
 - II. Authenticate server (optional), and perform key exchange
 - III. Authenticate client (optional), and perform key exchange
 - IV. Finish up
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- ## Client Hello Message
- Transmitted in plaintext
 - Contents
 - highest SSL version understood by client
 - R_C : a 4-byte timestamp + 28-byte random number
 - session ID: 0 for a new session, non-zero for a previous session
 - list of supported cryptographic algorithms
 - list of supported compression methods
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- ## Server Hello Message
- Also transmitted in plaintext
 - Contents
 - minimum of (highest version supported by server, highest version supported by client)
 - R_S : 4-byte timestamp and 28-byte random number
 - session ID
 - a cryptographic choice selected from the client's list
 - a compression method selected from the client's list
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II. Server Auth. / Key Exchange

Client Server

Server_Certificate

Server_Key_Exchange

Client_Certificate_Request

Server_Handshake_Done*

- The Server_Certificate message is optional, but **almost always used** in practice

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Server Certificate Message

- Contains a certificate with server's public key, in X.509 format
 - or, a chain of certificates if required
- The server certificate is **necessary** for any key exchange method except for anonymous Diffie-Hellman

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Authenticating the Server

Server's Certificate

Server's public key →

Certificate's serial number

Certificate's validity period

Server's DN

Issuer's DN

Issuer's digital signature

Client's list of trusted CAs

Issuing CA's Certificate

Issuer's DN

Issuer's public key →

Issuer's digital signature

1 Is today's date within validity period?

2 Is issuing CA a trusted CA?

3 Does issuing CA's public key validate issuer's digital signature?

4 Does the domain name specified in the server's DN match the server's actual domain name?

- Step #4: Domain name in certificate **must** match domain name of server (not part of SSL protocol, but clients should check this)

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Key Exchange Methods Supported

- **RSA** (server must have a certificate)
- **Ephemeral Public Key**
 - public keys are exchanged, signed using long-term RSA keys
- **Fixed Diffie-Hellman**
 - server provides the D-H public parameters in a certificate
 - client responds with D-H public key either in a certificate, or in a key exchange message
- **Anonymous Diffie-Hellman**
 - Diffie-Hellman without authentication
 - Susceptible to Man-in-the-middle attack

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Server_Key_Exchange Message

- Needed for...
 - anonymous D-H
 - ephemeral public key

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Server Key Exchange

	Handshake	Server Key Exchange (Diffie-Hellman)	Server Key Exchange (RSA)
Type			
Length			
Data		p (modulus, prime) g (generator) g ^h mod p Signature	m (modulus = p*q) e (pub. exp.) Signature
		Diffie-Hellman	RSA
	Client Computes: PreMasterSecret = (g ^a) ^b mod p		Client Computes: y = PreMasterSecret ^e mod p
	Client Sends : g ^a to server		Client sends : y to server
	Server Computes: PreMasterSecret = (g ^a) ^b mod p		Server Computes: PreMasterSecret = y ^d mod p


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Client_Certificate_Request Msg. WILLIAM & MARY

- Normally not used, because in **most** applications
 - only the server** is authenticated
 - client is authenticated at the application layer, if needed
- Two parameters
 - certificate type accepted, e.g., RSA/signature only, DSS/signature only, ...
 - list of certificate authorities recognized (i.e., trusted third parties)

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Client_Certificate Message WILLIAM & MARY

- Contains a certificate, or chain of certificates if needed

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Client_Key_Exchange Message WILLIAM & MARY


- If using RSA, the **pre-master secret S**, **encrypted** with the server's public key
- If using D-H, the client's public key

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Client_Certificate_Verify Msg WILLIAM & MARY

- Proves the client is the valid owner of a certificate (i.e., knows the corresponding private key)
- Only sent following any client certificate that has signing capability

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Change Cipher Spec Msg

- Confirms the change of the current state of the session to a newly-negotiated set of cryptographic parameters
- **Finished** Messages
 - keyed hash of the previous handshake messages to prevent man-in-the-middle-attacks from succeeding

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"Abbreviated" Protocol Possible

- Allows **resumption** of a previously-established session
 - does not require authentication of server or client
 - does not exchange keys
- Details omitted

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Creating the "Master" Secret

- The master secret is a one-time (per session) **48-byte** (= 16+16+16) value
- Parameters
 - the **pre-master secret S** has previously been communicated using RSA or D-H
 - the client nonce R_c
 - the server nonce R_s
- Computation: $K =$
 - MD5 (S | SHA-1("A" | S | R_c | R_s)) |
 - MD5 (S | SHA-1("BB" | S | R_c | R_s)) |
 - MD5 (S | SHA-1("CCC" | S | R_c | R_s))

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Cryptographic Parameters

- Generated from
 - the master secret K
 - R_c
 - R_s
- Values to be generated
 - client authentication and encryption keys
 - server authentication and encryption keys
 - client encryption IV
 - server encryption IV

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Alert Protocol Examples

- Type 1: **Fatal_Alert**
 - ex.: **Unexpected_Message**, **Bad_MAC**, etc.
 - connection is immediately terminated
- Type 2: **Warning**
 - ex.: **No_Certificate**, **Close_Notify**

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Summary

1. SSL is the de facto authentication/encryption protocol standard for HTTP
 - becoming popular for many other protocols as well
2. Allows negotiation of cryptographic methods and parameters

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