

# CSCI 454/554 Computer and Network Security

Topic 3.1 Secret Key Cryptography – Algorithms



### Outline



- Introductory Remarks
- Feistel Cipher
- DES
- AES



### Introduction



### Secret Keys or Secret Algorithms?



- "Security by obscurity"
  - "hide" the details of the algorithms
  - drawback: hard to keep secret if cipher is used widely, or implementation can be reverse engineered
- Alternative: publish the algorithms
  - fewer vulnerabilities will result if many smart people try and fail to break the cipher
  - security of the cipher depends on the secrecy of the keys, instead



### Secrets? (Cont'd)




- Commercial world relies upon standardized, public algorithms, and secret keys
- Government tends to also rely on secret algorithms



### Secret Key Cryptography





- Same key is used for both encryption and decryption
  - this one key is shared by two parties who wish to communicate securly
- Also known as symmetric key cryptography, or shared key cryptography



### Applications of Secret Key Crypto WILLIAM GMARY

- Communicating securely over an insecure channel
  - Alice encrypts using shared key
  - Bob decrypts result using same shared key
- Secure storage on insecure media
  - Bob encrypts data before storage
  - Bob decrypts data on retrieval using the same key



### Applications... (Cont'd)



#### Message integrity

- Alice computes a message integrity code (MIC) from the message, then encrypts with shared key
- Bob decrypts the MIC on receipt, and verifies that it agrees with message contents

#### Authentication


- Bob can verify Alice sent the message
- how is that possible?



### Generic Block Encryption



- Converts one input plaintext block of fixed size k bits to an output ciphertext block also of k bits
- Benefits of large k? of short k?





### **Key Sizes**



- Keys should be selected from a large potential set, to prevent brute force attacks
- Secret key sizes
  - 40 bits were considered adequate in 70's
  - 56 bits used by DES were adequate in the 80's
  - 128 bits are adequate for now
- If computers increase in power by 40% per year, need roughly 5 more key bits per decade to stay "sufficiently" hard to break



### Notation



Notation	Meaning
X ⊕ Y	Bit-wise exclusive-or of X and Y
XIY	Concatenation of X and Y
K{ <i>m</i> }	Message m encrypted with secret key K



#### Two Principles for Cipher Design

#### WILLIAM &MARY

#### Confusion:

 Make the relationship between the <plaintext, key> input and the <ciphertext> output as complex (nonlinear) as possible

#### Diffusion:

 Spread the influence of each input bit across many output bits



### **Exploiting the Principles**




- Idea: use multiple, alternating permutations and substitutions, e.g.,
  - $S \rightarrow P \rightarrow S \rightarrow P \rightarrow S \rightarrow ...$
  - $P \rightarrow S \rightarrow P \rightarrow S \rightarrow P \rightarrow ...$
- Do they have to alternate? e.g....
  - $S \rightarrow S \rightarrow S \rightarrow P \rightarrow P \rightarrow S \rightarrow S \rightarrow ...$ ??
- Confusion is mainly accomplished by substitutions
- Diffusion is mainly accomplished by permutations
- Example ciphers: DES, AES



### Secret Key... (Cont'd)



 Basic technique used in secret key ciphers: multiple applications of alternating substitutions and permutations




Well-known examples: DES, AES



#### Basic Form of Modern Block Ciphers GMARY









## Feistel Ciphers



#### Overview




- Feistel Cipher has been a very influential "template" for designing a block cipher
- Major benefit: can do encryption and decryption with the same hardware
- Examples: DES, RC5



### One "Round" of Feistel Encryption



- Break input block i into left and right halves L<sub>i</sub> and R<sub>i</sub>
- 2. Copy  $R_i$  to create output half block  $L_{i+1}$
- Half block R, and key K<sub>i</sub> are "scrambled" by function *f*
- 4. XOR result with input half-block L<sub>i</sub> to create output half-block R<sub>i+1</sub>






## One "Round" of Feistel Decryption WILLIAM GMARY




 Just reverse the arrows!






### Complete Feistel Cipher: Encryption MARY





## Feistel Cipher: Decryption WILLIAM & MARY





## 

- Block size
- Key size
- Number of rounds
- Subkey generation algorithm
- "Scrambling" function f



#### Comments



- Decryption is the same as encryption, only reversing the order in which round keys are applied
  - Reversability of Feistel cipher derives from reversability of XOR
- Function f can be anything
  - Hopefully something easy to compute
  - There is no need to invert f





### DES (Data Encryption Standard)



#### DES (Data Encryption Standard)



- Standardized in 1976 by NBS (now NIST)
  - proposed by IBM,
  - Feistel cipher
- Criteria (official)
  - provide high level of security
  - security must reside in key, not algorithm
  - not patented
  - must be exportable
  - efficient to implement in hardware



### DES... (Cont'd)



- Criteria (unofficial)
  - must be slow to execute in software
  - must be breakable by NSA :-)



#### **DES Basics**




- Blocks: 64 bit plaintext input,
   64 bit ciphertext output
- Rounds: 16
- Key: 64 bits
  - every 8<sup>th</sup> bit is a parity bit, so really <u>56</u> bits long





### **DES Top Level View**








### Initial and Final Permutations WILLIAN GRANN



- Initial permutation given below
  - input bit  $#58 \rightarrow$  output bit #1, input bit  $#50 \rightarrow$  output bit #2, ...

58	50	42	34	26	18	10	2
60	52	44	36	28	20	12	4
62	54	46	38	30	22	14	6
64	56	48	40	32	24	16	8
57	49	41	33	25	17	9	1
59	51	43	35	27	19	11	3
61	53	45	37	29	21	13	5
63	55	47	39	31	23	15	7






### Initial... (Cont'd)



- Final permutation is just inverse of initial permutation, i.e.,
  - input bit #1→ output bit #58
  - input bit #2→ output bit #50



. . . .



## Initial... (Cont'd)




- Note #1: Initial Permutation is fully specified (independent of key)
  - therefore, does not improve security!
  - why needed?
- Note #2: Final Permutation is needed to make this a Feistel cipher
  - i.e., can use same hardware for both encryption and decryption



### 

First step: throw out 8 parity
 bits, then permute resulting 56
 bits 7 columns

57	49	41	33	25	17	9
1	58	50	42	34	26	18
10	2	59	51	43	35	27
19	11	3	60	52	44	36
63	55	47	39	31	23	15
7	62	54	46	38	30	22
14	6	61	53	45	37	29
21	13	5	28	20	12	4




*Parity bits left out:* 8,16,24,...



#### KeyGen: Processing Per Round







#### KeyGen: Permutation with Discard



28 bits → 24 bits, each half of key

Left half of  $K_i$  = permutation of  $C_i$ 

14	17	11	24	1	5
3	28	15	6	21	10
23	19	12	4	26	8
16	7	27	20	13	2

Bits left out: 9,18,22,25

Right half of  $K_i$  = permutation of  $D_i$ 


Bits left out: 35,38,43,54


41	52	31	37	47	55
30	40	51	45	33	48
44	49	39	56	34	53
46	42	50	36	29	32



## One DES (Feistel) Round WILLIAM GMARY











## DES Round: f (Mangler) Function WILLIAM GMARY







## f. Expansion Function



• 32 bits → 48 bits


	— these	e bits a	ire <mark>re</mark> p	peated <b>–</b>	
32	1	2	3	4	5
4	5	6	7	8	9
8	9	10	11	12	13
12	13	14	15	16	17
16	17	18	19	20	21
20	21	22	23	24	25
24	25	26	27	28	29
28	29	30	31	32	1



## f: S-Box (Substitute, Shrink)



- 48 bits → 32 bits
  - 48 bit is broken into eight 6-bit chunks.
  - 6 bits are used to select a 4-bit substitution
  - i.e., for every output, there are four inputs that map to it





## f. S<sub>1</sub> (Substitution)



Each row and column contain different numbers

I2/I3/I	[4/I5 ·	<b>→</b> 0	1	2	3	4	5	6	•••	F
11/16	0	Е	4	D	1	2	F	В		
16 <b>→</b>	1	0	F	7	4	E	2	D		
	2	4	1	E	8	D	6	2		
	3	F	C	8	2	4	9	1		

Example: input= 100110, output= 1000

for  $S_2...S_8$  (and rest of  $S_1$ ), see the textbook



### f. Permutation



■ 32bits **→** 32bits

16	7	20	21
29	12	28	17
1	15	23	26
5	18	31	10
2	8	24	14
32	27	3	9
19	13	30	6
22	11	4	25



## **DES Implementation**



- That's it!
- Operations
  - Permutation
  - Swapping halves
  - Substitution (S-box, table lookup)
  - Bit discard
  - Bit replication
  - Circular shift
  - XOR
- Hard to implement? HW: No, SW: Yes





## **DES Analysis**



## Good Design?



- "We don't know if
  - the particular details were well-chosen for strength,
  - whether someone flipped coins to construct the S-boxes,
  - or whether the details were chosen to have a weakness that could be exploited by the designers."



## **Issues for Block Ciphers**



 Number of rounds should be large enough to make advanced attacks as expensive as exhaustive search for the key



## Principles for S-Box Design WILLIAM Design WILLIAM Principles for S-Box Design WILLIAM DESIGN WI

- S-box is the only non-linear part of DES
- Each row in the S-Box table should be a permutation of the possible output values
- Output of one S-box should affect other Sboxes in the following round



### Desirable Property: Avalanche Effect



- Roughly: a small change in either the plaintext or the key should produce a big change in the ciphertext
- Better: any output bit should be inverted (flipped) with probability 0.5 if any input bit is changed
- f function
  - must be difficult to un-scramble
  - should achieve avalanche effect
  - output bits should be uncorrelated



### DES Avalanche Effect: Example



- 2 plaintexts with 1 bit difference:
   0x0000000000000000 and
   0x800000000000000
   encrypted using the same key:
   0x016B24621C181C32
- Resulting ciphertexts differ in 34 bits (out of 64)
- Similar results when keys differ by 1 bit



## Example (cont'd)



 An experiment: number of rounds vs. number of bits difference

Round #	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Bits changed	1	6	21	35	39	34	32	31	29

9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
42	44	32	30	30	26	29	34



## **DES: Keys to Avoid Using**



- "Weak keys": 4 keys with property  $K\{K\{m\}\} = m$
- What's bad about that?
- These are keys which, after the first key permutation, are:
  - 28 0's followed by 28 0's
  - 28 0's followed by 28 1's
  - 28 1's followed by 28 0's
  - 28 1's followed by 28 1's



## More Keys to Avoid!



"Semi-weak keys": pairs of keys with the property

$$\mathsf{K}_1\{\mathsf{K}_2\{m\}\} = m$$

- What's bad about that?
- These are keys which, after the first key permutation, are:
  - 1. 28 0's followed by alternating 0's and 1's
  - 2. 28 0's followed by alternating 1's and 0's

...

alternating 1's and 0's followed by alternating 1's and 0's



## **DES Key Size**



- 56 bits is currently too small to resist brute force attacks using readily-available hardware
- Ten years ago it took \$250,000 to build a machine that could crack DES in a few hours
- Now?



## Cryptanalysis of DES



- Differential cryptanalysis exploits differences between encryptions of two different plaintext blocks
  - provides insight into possible key values
  - DES well designed to defeat differential analysis
- Linear cryptanalysis requires known plaintext / ciphertext pairs, analyzes relationships to discover key value
  - for DES, requires analyzing  $O(2^{47})$  pairs
- No attacks on DES so far are significantly better than brute force attacks, for comparable cost





# AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)



### Overview




- Selected from an open competition, organized by NSA
  - winner: Rijndael algorithm, standardized as AES
  - A short history: <u>http://www.moserware.com/2009/09/stick-figure-guide-to-advanced.html</u>
- Some similarities to DES (rounds, round keys, alternate permutation+substitution)
  - but not a Feistel cipher
- Block size = 128 bits
- Key sizes = 128, 192, or 256
- Main criteria: secure, well justified, fast



### **AES-128 Overview**





- Q1: What happens in each round?
- Q2: How are round keys generated?



### AES-128 State



 Each plaintext block of 16 bytes is arranged as 4 columns of 4 bytes each





$a_0$	a <sub>4</sub>	a <sub>8</sub>	a <sub>12</sub>
$a_1$	$a_5$	a <sub>9</sub>	a <sub>13</sub>
a <sub>2</sub>	<b>a</b> <sub>6</sub>	a <sub>10</sub>	a <sub>14</sub>
a <sub>3</sub>	a <sub>7</sub>	a <sub>11</sub>	a <sub>15</sub>

(Padding necessary for messages not a multiple of 16 bytes)




### One AES-128 Round



- Apply S-box function to each byte of the state (i.e., 16 substitutions)
- 2. Rotate...
  - (row 0 of state is unchanged)
  - row 1 of the state shifts left 1 column
  - row 2 of the state shifts left 2 columns
  - row 3 of the state shifts left 3 columns
- 3. Apply MixColumn function to each column of state
  - last round omits this step



## AES Encryption/Decryption WILLIAM GMARY





## Round Step 1. AES S-Box WILLIAM GMARY



- Each byte of state is replaced by a value from following table
  - eg. byte with value 0x95 is replaced by byte in row 9 column 5, which has value 0x2A

									3	Č							
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	С	d	е	f
	0	63	7c	77	7b	f2	6b	6f	<b>c</b> 5	30	1	67	2b	fe	d7	ab	76
	1	ca	82	с9	7d	fa	59	47	f0	ad	d4	a2	af	9c	a4	72	c0
	2	b7	fd	93	26	36	3f	£7	CC	34	<b>a</b> 5	<b>e</b> 5	f1	71	d8	31	15
	3	4	c7	23	с3	18	96	5	9a	7	12	80	e2	eb	27	b2	75
	4	9	83	2c	1a	1b	6e	5a	a0	52	3b	d6	<b>b</b> 3	29	<b>e</b> 3	2f	84
	5	53	d1	0	ed	20	fc	b1	5b	6a	cb	be	39	4a	4c	58	cf
	6	d0	ef	aa	fb	43	4d	33	85	45	f9	2	7f	50	3с	9f	a8
x	7	51	a3	40	8f	92	9d	38	f5	bc	b6	da	21	10	ff	f3	d2
•	8	cd	0 0	13	ec	5f	97	44	17	c4	a7	7e	3d	64	5d	19	73
	9	60	81	4f	dc	22	2a	90	88	46	ee	b8	14	de	5e	0b	db
	a	e0	32	3a	0a	49	6	24	5c	c2	d3	ac	62	91	95	e4	79
	b	<b>e</b> 7	c8	37	6d	8d	d5	4e	<b>a</b> 9	6c	56	f4	ea	65	7a	ae	8
	С	ba	78	25	2e	1c	a6	b4	с6	<b>e</b> 8	dd	74	1f	4b	bd	8b	8a
	d	70	3e	b5	66	48	3	f6	0e	61	35	57	b9	86	c1	1d	9e
	е	e1	f8	98	11	69	d9	8e	94	9b	1e	87	<b>e</b> 9	се	55	28	df
	f	8c	a1	89	0d	bf	e6	42	68	41	99	2d	0f	b0	54	bb	16



## S-Box (Cont'd)



## The S-Box is what makes AES a non-linear cipher

For every value of b there is a unique value for b'

- It is faster to use a substitution table (and easier).

 $x = b^{-1}$  in GF(28), i.e., x is the inverse of byte b




## S-Box Example



The S-Box is what makes AES a non-linear cipher

#### **State**



		<u> </u>	
53	CA	70	0C
D0	B7	D6	DC
51	04	F8	32
63	BA	68	79



## Round Step 2. Rotate (Example) WILLIAM GMARY

#### **Before Shift Rows**

#### **After Shift Rows**

53	CA	70	0 <i>C</i>		53	CA	70	0 <i>C</i>
D0	B7	D6	DC	<b>→</b>	B7	D6		D0
51	04	F8	32		F8	32	51	04
63	BA	68	79		79	63	BA	68



### Round Step 3. MixColumn Function



- Applied to each column of the state
- For each column, each byte a<sub>i</sub>...a<sub>i+3</sub> of the column is used to look up four 4-byte intermediate columns t<sub>i</sub>...t<sub>i+3</sub> from a table (next slide)
- The intermediate columns t<sub>i</sub>...t<sub>i+3</sub> are then combined (next slide + 1):
  - rotate vertically so top octet of t<sub>i</sub> is in the same row as input octet (a<sub>i</sub>)
  - XOR the four rotated columns together



## MixColumn... (Cont'd)



Part of the MixColumn table:

right (low-order) nibble (4 bits)


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		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	C	đ	e	£
		00	02	04	06	80	0a	0c	0e	10	12	14	16	18	1a	1c	1e
<b>t</b> s	0	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0a	0Ъ	0c	0d	0e	0f
· <u>\</u>	١	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	80	09	0a	0b	0c	0d	0e	0f
4		00	03	06	05	0c	0f	0a	09	18	1b	1e	1d	14	17	12	11
4		20	22	24	26	28	2a	2c	2e	30	32	34	36	38	3a	3c	3e
	1	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	1a	1b	1c	1d	1e	1f
O	-	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	la	1b	1c	1d	1e	1f
21	- 1	30	33	36	35	3c	3f	3a	39	28	2b	2e	2d	24	27	22	21
<b>1</b> C		40	42	44	46	48	4a	4c	4e	50	52	54	56	58	5a	5c	5e
==	2	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	2a	2ъ	2c	2d	2e	2f
1	-	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	2a	2b	2c	2d	2e	2£
$\widehat{}$		60	63	66	65	6c	6£	6a	69	78	7b	7e	7d	74	77	72	71
		60	62	FA	66	68	Кa	60	60	70	72	74	76	78	7a	7c	7e
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		<b>4</b> 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	100000000000000000000000000000000000000	bf	bd	<b>b</b> 3	b1	b7	b5	ab	a9	af	ad	<b>a</b> 3	al	a7	a5
۲		bb	b9		400000000000000000000000000000000000000			1000000000		200 CO 200 CO					200 M 200 M 200		
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1-0Ľ	d	<b>d</b> 0	d1 d1	d2 d2	d3 d3	d4 d4	d5 d5	đ6	d7	đ8	d9	da	đb	dc	dd	de de	df df
zh-or	d	d0 d0 6b	d1 d1 68	d2 d2 6d	d3 d3 6e	d4 d4 67	d5 d5 64	d6 61	d7 62	đ8 73	<b>d</b> 9	da 75	db 76	dc 7f	dd 7c	de de 79	df df 7a
igh-or	đ	d0 d0 6b db	d1 d1 68 d9	d2 d2 6d df	d3 d3 6e dd	d4 d4 67 d3	d5 d5 64 d1	d6 61 d7	d7 62 d5	d8 73 cb	d9 70 c9	da 75 cf	db 76 cd	dc 7f c3	dd 7c c1	de de 79 c7	df df 7a c5
high-or	d e	d0 d0 6b db e0	d1 d1 68 d9 e1	d2 d2 6d df e2	d3 d3 6e dd e3	d4 d4 67 d3 e4	d5 d5 64 d1 e5	d6 61 d7 e6	d7 62 d5 e7	d8 73 cb e8	d9 70 c9 e9	da 75 cf ea	db 76 cd eb	dc 7f c3 ec	dd 7c c1 ed	de de 79 c7 ee	df df 7a c5 ef
(high-or		d0 d0 6b db e0 e0	d1 d1 68 d9 e1 e1	d2 d2 6d df e2 e2	d3 d3 6e dd e3 e3	d4 d4 67 d3 e4 e4	d5 d5 64 d1 e5 e5	d6 61 d7 e6 e6	d7 62 d5 e7 e7	d8 73 cb e8 e8	d9 70 c9 e9 e9	da 75 cf ea ea	db 76 cd eb eb	dc 7f c3 ec ec	dd 7c cl ed ed	de de 79 c7 ee ee	df df 7a c5 ef ef
ft (high-or		d0 d0 6b db e0 e0 3b	d1 d1 68 d9 e1 e1 38	d2 d2 6d df e2 e2	d3 d3 6e dd e3 e3	d4 d4 67 d3 e4 e4 37	d5 d5 64 d1 e5 e5	d6 61 d7 e6 e6 31	d7 62 d5 e7 e7 32	d8 73 cb e8 e8 23	d9 70 c9 e9 e9	da 75 cf ea ea 25	db 76 cd eb eb 26	dc 7f c3 ec ec 2f	dd 7c c1 ed ed 2c	de de 79 c7 ee ee 29	df df 7a c5 ef ef 2a
eft (high-or	е	d0 d0 6b db e0 e0 3b	d1 d1 68 d9 e1 e1 38	d2 d2 6d df e2 e2 3d ff	d3 d3 6e dd e3 e3 3e	d4 d4 67 d3 e4 e4 37	d5 d5 64 d1 e5 e5 34	d6 61 d7 e6 e6 31	d7 62 d5 e7 e7 32 f5	d8 73 cb e8 e8 23 eb	d9 70 c9 e9 e9 20	da 75 cf ea ea 25 ef	db 76 cd eb eb 26	dc 7f c3 ec ec 2f e3	dd 7c c1 ed ed 2c e1	de de 79 c7 ee ee 29	df df 7a c5 ef ef 2a e5
left (high-order) nibble (4 bits)		d0 d0 6b db e0 e0 3b fb f0	d1 d1 68 d9 e1 e1 38 f9 f1	d2 d2 6d df e2 e2 3d ff f2	d3 d3 6e dd e3 e3 3e fd f3	d4 d4 67 d3 e4 e4 37 f3 f4	d5 d5 64 d1 e5 e5 34 f1 f5	d6 61 d7 e6 e6 31 f7 f6	d7 62 d5 e7 e7 32 f5 f7	d8 73 cb e8 e8 23 eb f8	d9 70 c9 e9 e9 20 e9 f9	da 75 cf ea ea 25 ef fa	db 76 cd eb eb 26 ed fb	dc 7f c3 ec ec 2f e3 fc	dd 7c cl ed ed 2c el fd	de de 79 c7 ee ee 29	df df 7a c5 ef ef 2a
left (high-or	е	d0 d0 6b db e0 e0 3b	d1 d1 68 d9 e1 e1 38	d2 d2 6d df e2 e2 3d ff	d3 d3 6e dd e3 e3 3e	d4 d4 67 d3 e4 e4 37	d5 d5 64 d1 e5 e5 34	d6 61 d7 e6 e6 31	d7 62 d5 e7 e7 32 f5	d8 73 cb e8 e8 23 eb	d9 70 c9 e9 e9 20	da 75 cf ea ea 25 ef	db 76 cd eb eb 26	dc 7f c3 ec ec 2f e3	dd 7c c1 ed ed 2c e1	de de 79 c7 ee ee 29 e7 fe	df df 7a c5 ef ef 2a e5 ff



## MixColumn... (Cont'd)



#### Example





### Generating Round Keys in AES-128



The key (16 bytes) is arranged in 4 columns of 4 rows, as for the input (plaintext) block)

Deriving the round keys makes use of a table of constants:

Removes symmetry and linearity from key expansion

Round i	Constant c <sub>i</sub>
1	0x01
2	0 <b>x</b> 02
3	0x04
4	0x08
5	0 <b>x</b> 10
6	0 <b>x</b> 20
7	0 <b>x</b> 40
8	0x80
9	0x1b
10	0 <b>x</b> 36



## Round Keys... (Cont'd)



For  $i^{th}$  round of keys, i = 1..10

```
for column index j = 0

temp = column 3 of

(i-1)<sup>th</sup> (previous) round

rotate temp upward one byte

S-Box transform each byte

of temp

XOR first byte of temp with c_i
```


```
for column index j = 1..3
temp = column j-1 of i<sup>th</sup> (this) round
```

result = temp XOR  $j^{th}$  column of key round i-1



## Round Keys... (Cont'd)





**Figure 3-30.** Rijndael key expansion, iteration step,  $N_k \le 6$ 



## **Key Expansion Rationale**



- Designed to resist known attacks
- Design criteria include
  - knowing part of the key doesn't make it easy to find entire key
  - key expansion must be invertible, but enough non-linearity to hinder analysis
  - should be fast to compute, simple to describe and analyze
  - key bits should be diffused into the round keys



### **Mathematics**



### AES Operates on the binary field GF(28)

- this can be represented as a polynomial b(x) with binary coefficients  $b \in \{0,1\}$ :

$$b_7x^7 + b_6x^6 + b_5x^5 + b_4x^4 + b_3x^3 + b_2x^2 + b_1x + b_0$$

Multiplication in GF(28) consists of multiplying two polynomials modulo an irreducible polynomial of degree 8

- AES uses the following irreducible polynomial

$$m(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$$



## AES-128 Decryption (Conceptual) WILLIAM GMARY

- Run cipher in reverse, with inverse of each operation replacing the encryption operations
- Inverse operations:
  - XOR is its own inverse
  - inverse of S-box is just the inverse table (next slide)
  - inverse of rotation in one direction is rotation in other direction
  - inverse of MixColumn is just the inverse table (next slide + 1)



## Inverse S-Box



									•	<b>Y</b>							
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	а	b	С	d	е	f
	0	52	9	<b>6</b> a	d5	30	36	a5	38	bf	40	a3	9e	81	f3	d7	fb
	1	7c	<b>e3</b>	39	82	9b	<b>2</b> f	ff	87	34	8e	43	44	c4	de	<b>e9</b>	cb
	2	54	7b	94	32	a6	<b>c2</b>	23	3d	ee	4c	95	0b	42	fa	сЗ	<b>4e</b>
	3	8	<b>2e</b>	a1	66	28	d9	24	<b>b2</b>	76	<b>5</b> b	a2	49	6d	8b	d1	25
	4	72	f8	f6	64	86	<b>68</b>	98	16	d4	a4	<b>5</b> c	CC	<b>5</b> d	65	b6	92
	5	<b>6</b> C	70	48	50	fd	ed	b9	da	<b>5</b> e	15	46	57	a7	8d	9d	84
	6	90	d8	ab	0	8c	bc	d3	0a	f7	e4	<b>5</b> 8	5	b8	b3	45	6
X	7	d0	<b>2</b> c	1e	8f	ca	3f	Of	2	<b>c1</b>	af	bd	3	1	13	8a	6b
^	8	<b>3</b> a	91	11	41	4f	67	dc	ea	97	f2	cf	се	f0	b4	<b>e6</b>	<b>73</b>
	9	96	ac	74	22	e7	ad	35	85	<b>e2</b>	<b>f</b> 9	37	<b>e</b> 8	1c	75	df	<b>6e</b>
	а	47	f1	1a	71	<b>1d</b>	29	<b>c5</b>	89	6f	b7	62	<b>0e</b>	aa	18	be	1b
	b	fc	56	<b>3e</b>	4b	c6	d2	79	20	<b>9</b> a	db	c0	fe	78	cd	<b>5</b> a	f4
	С	1f	dd	a8	33	88	7	с7	31	b1	12	10	<b>5</b> 9	27	80	ес	5f
	d	60	51	7f	a9	19	<b>b5</b>	4a	0d	<b>2</b> d	<b>e</b> 5	7a	9f	93	с9	9c	ef
	е	a0	e0	3b	4d	ae	<b>2</b> a	f5	b0	с8	eb	bb	<b>3</b> c	83	53	99	61
	f	17	2b	4	7e	ba	77	d6	26	e1	69	14	63	<b>55</b>	21	0c	7d



## InvMixColumn



right (low-order) nibble (4 bits)																		
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	а	b	С	d	е	f	
		00	0e	10	12	38	36	24	2a	70	7e	6c	62	48	46	54	5a	
left (high-order) nibble (4 bits)	0	00	09	12	1b	24	2d	36	3f	48	41	5 <b>a</b>	53	6c	65	7e	77	
	`	00	0d	1a	17	34	39	2e	23	68	65	72	7 £	5c	51	46	4b	
		00	0b	16	1d	2c	27	3a	31	58	53	4e	45	74	7 f	62	69	
$\overline{0}$	ĺ	e0	ee	fc	f2	d8	d6	C4	ca	90	9e	8c	82	a8	a6	b4	ba	
$\equiv$	1	90	99	82	8b	b4	bd	a6	af	<b>g8</b>	d1	ca	с3	fc	f5	ee	e7	
7	<i>†</i> (	d0	dd	ca	c7	e4	<b>e</b> 9	fe	£3	<b>b8</b>	b5	a2	af	8c	81	96	9Ъ	
<u>(1)</u>		ь0	bb	<b>a</b> 6	ad	9c	97	8a	81	e8	<b>e</b> 3	fe	f5	c4	cf	d2	d9	ž.
1	Í	db	d5	c7	c9	<b>e</b> 3	ed	ff	f1	ab	a5	<b>b</b> 7	b9	93	9d	8f	81	85
5	,	3b	32	29	20	1f	16	0d	04	73	7a	61	68	57	5e	45	4c	
11	-	bb	b6	al	ac	8f	82	95	98	d3	de	c9	c4	e7	ea	fd	fO	
$\mathbf{n}$		7b	70	6d	66	57	5c	41	4a	23	28	35	3e	0f	04	19	12	
		ีวนไ	ם כ	07	20	00	\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	16	7 4	21.	4 -		E 0		- J			
CI		IUT	ιυa	L 1 /	I TC	ı⊿α	L 4 b	at	30	59	52	41	44	75	/e	63	68	
D		0c	02	10	1e	34	3a	28	26	7c	72	60	6e	44	4a	58	56	
$\mathbf{I}$	2	0a	03	18	11	2e	27	3c	35	42	4b	50	59	66	6£	74	7d	
Ĭ	đ	67	6a	7d	70	53	5e	49	44	0£	02	15	18	3b	36	21	2c	
T	`	b1	ba	a7	ac	9d	96	8b	80	e9	e2	ff	f4	c5	ce	<b>d</b> 3	d8	
15	,	37	39	2b	25	Of	01	13	1d	47	49	5b	55	7£	71	63	6d	
h		a1	a8	<b>b</b> 3	ba	85	8c	97	9e	<b>e</b> 9	e0	fb	f2	cd	c4	df	d6	
$\sim$	e	0c	01	16	1Ъ	38	35	22	2f	64	69	7e	73	50	5d	4a	47	
Ä		7a	71	6c	67	56	5d	40	4b	22	29	34	3f	0e	05	18	13	
		<b>d</b> 7	<b>d9</b>	cb	c5	ef	e1	£3	fd	a7	a9	bb	b5	9£	91	83	8d	
$\overline{}$			100000000000000000000000000000000000000			15	1c	07	0e	79	70	6b	62	5d	54	4 £	46	
		31	38	23	2a	ГТЭ	10	0 /									- 0	
	f	31 dc	38 d1	23 C6	cb	e8	e5	£2	ff	b4	ь9		Port of the Control o	80	8d		97	
			- 10 Marin	MARKA SALE		are townsomer	10000000000	200000		200200000		ae 84	a3 8f	CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR	7.000.000.00	9a a8		



## **AES Decryption (Actual)**



- Run cipher in forward direction, except...
  - use inverse operations
  - apply round keys in reverse order
  - apply InvMixColumn to round keys K1..K9
- Decryption takes more memory and cycles encryption
  - can only partially reuse hardware for encryption



### **AES Assessment**



- Speed: about 16 clock cycles/byte on modern 32-bit CPUs
  - 200 MByte/s on a PC, no special hardware!
- No known successful attacks on full AES
  - best attacks work on 7-9 rounds (out of 10-14 rounds)
- Clean design
- For brute force attacks, AES-128 will take  $4*10^{21} \text{ X} (=2^{72})$  more effort than DES



### Attacks on AES



Differential Cryptanalysis: based on how differences in inputs correlate with differences in outputs

- greatly reduced due to high number of rounds

Linear Cryptanalysis: based on correlations between input and output

 S-Box & MixColumns are designed to frustrate Linear Analysis

Side Channel Attacks: based on peculiarities of the implementation of the cipher



### Side Channel Attacks



## Timing Attacks: measure the time it takes to do operations

- some operations, with some operands, are much faster than other operations, with other operand values
- provides clues about what internal operations are being performed, and what internal data values are being produced

## Power Attacks: measures power to do operations

 changing one bit requires considerably less power than changing many bits in a byte



## Summary



- Secret key crypto is (a) good quality, (b) faster to compute than public key crypto, and (c) the most widely used crypto
- DES strong enough for non-critical applications, but triple-DES is better
- AES even better (stronger and much faster), has versions with 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys
- Secret key crypto requires "out-of-band", bilateral key negotiation/agreement