


Protocols

WILLIAM どMARY

- Goal: application independent security
 - Originally for HTTP, but now used for many applications
 - Each application has an assigned TCP port, e.g., https (HTTP over SSL) uses port 443
- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
 - the de facto standard for web-based security
 - v3 was developed with public review
- Transport Layer Security (TLS)
 - TLS v1.0 very close to SSL v3.1

5

Ŵ	Pro	tocol ov	ver SSL/TLS WILLIA
	Keyword	Decimal	Description
	nsiiops	261/tcp	IIOP Name Service over TLS/SSL
	https	443/tcp	http protocol over TLS/SSL
	ddm-ssl	448/tcp	DDM-SSL
	smtps	465/tcp	smtp protocol over TLS/SSL
	nntps	563/tcp	nntp protocol over TLS/SSL
	sshell	614/tcp	SSLshell
	ldaps	636/tcp	ldap protocol over TLS/SSL
	ftps-data	989/tcp	ftp protocol, data, over TLS/SSL
	ftps	990/tcp	ftp, control, over TLS/SSL
	telnets	992/tcp	telnet protocol over TLS/SSL
	imaps	993/tcp	imap4 protocol over TLS/SSL
	ircs	994/tcp	irc protocol over TLS/SSL
	pop3s	995/tcp	pop3 protocol over TLS/SSL
		•	
			6



Architecture (Cont'd)

WILLIAM &MARY

- Handshake protocol: establishment of a session key
- Change Cipher protocol: start using the previously-negotiated encryption / message authentication
- Alert protocol: notification (warnings or fatal exceptions)
- Record protocol: protected (encrypted, authenticated) communication between client and server

8


SSL Services


WILLIAM &MARY

- Peer authentication
- Negotiation of security parameters
- Generation / distribution of session keys
- Data confidentiality
- Data integrity


Connections and Sessions WILLIAM & MARY SSL Session an association between peers created through a handshake, negotiates security parameters, can be long-lasting SSL Connection a type of service (i.e., an application) between a client and a server Multiple connections can be part of a single session **Session** Parameters WILLIAM & MARY Session ID X.509 public-key certificate of peer Compression algorithm to use Cipher specification: encryption algorithm, message digest, etc. Master (session) secret: 48-byte (384 bits) secret negotiated between peers **Connection Parameters** WILLIAM & MARY Server and client nonces Server and client authentication keys Server and client encryption keys Server and client initialization vectors Current message sequence number

Ciphers Supported by SSL WILLIAM CARRY ■ DES+HMAC/SHA-1 ■ 3DES+HMAC/SHA-1 RC4+MD5 RC2+MD5 +others **X** WILLIAM & MARY The SSL Record Protocol **Protocol Steps** WILLIAM & MARY 1. Fragment data stream into records • each with a maximum length of 2¹⁴ (=16K) bytes 2. Compress each record 3. Create message authentication code for each record 4. Encrypt each record





*	Possible	Record	"Pay	oads"	ILLIAM MARY		
	1 byte	1 byte Type	3 bytes Length	≥ 0 bytes Content			
(a) C	Change Cipher Spec Protocol		(c) Handshake Protocol				
	1 byte 1 byte Level Alert	≥ 1 byte OpaqueContent					
	(b) Alert Protocol	(d) Other Upper-Layer Protocol (e.g., HTTP)					
					18		





Ŵ

Phases of Protocol

WILLIAM & MARY

- Establish security capabilities
 - · version of SSL to use
 - · cipher + parameters to use
- II. Authenticate server (optional), and perform key exchange
- III. Authenticate client (optional), and perform key exchange
- ıv. Finish up






Client Hello Message WHLHAM

- Transmitted in plaintext
- Contents
 - highest SSL version understood by client
 - R_C: a 4-byte timestamp + 28-byte random number
 - session ID: 0 for a new session, nonzero for a previous session
 - list of supported cryptographic algorithms
 - list of supported compression methods

Server Hello Message WHLLAM

- Also transmitted in plaintext
- Contents
 - minimum of (highest version supported by server, highest version supported by client)
 - R_S: 4-byte timestamp and 28-byte random number
 - session ID
 - a cryptographic choice selected from the client's list
 - a compression method selected from the client's list



Server_Certificate Message WILLIAM

- Contains a certificate with server's public key, in X.509 format
 - or, a chain of certificates if required
- The server certificate is necessary for any key exchange method except for anonymous Diffie-Hellman

26

Authenticating the Server

Server's Certificate
Server's public key
Certificate's validity period
Certificate's validity period
Server's DN
Issuer's DN
Issuer's DN
Issuer's DN
Issuer's digital
Signature

Does issuing CA's
public key-validate
issuer's digital
Signature

Step #4: Domain name in certificate must match domain
name of server (not part of SSL protocol, but clients should
check this)


Key Exchange Methods Supported MARY

- RSA (server must have a certificate)
- Ephemeral Public Key
 - public keys are exchanged, signed using long-term RSA keys
- Fixed Diffie-Hellman
 - server provides the D-H public parameters in a certificate
 - · client responds with D-H public key either in a certificate, or in a key exchange message
- Anonymous Diffie-Hellman
 - · Diffie-Hellman without authentication
 - Susceptible to Man-in-the-middle attack

Server_Key_Exchange **Message** MARY

- Needed for...
 - anonymous D-H
 - ephemeral public key


WILLIAM どMARY





- Normally not used, because in most applications
 - only the server is authenticated
 - client is authenticated at the application layer, if needed
- Two parameters
 - certificate type accepted, e.g., RSA/ signature only, DSS/signature only, ...
 - list of certificate authorities recognized (i.e., trusted third parties)

21



Client Certificate Message MARY


Contains a certificate, or chain of certificates if needed



Client_Certificate_Verify Msg WHLHAM

- Proves the client is the valid owner of a

- Proves the client is the valid owner of a certificate (i.e., knows the corresponding private key)
- Only sent following any client certificate that has signing capability



Change Cipher Spec Msg ***
 Confirms the change of the current state of the session to a newly-negotiated set of cryptographic parameters Finished Messages keyed hash of the previous handshake messages to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks from succeeding
"Abbreviated" Protocol Possible
 Allows resumption of a previously- established session

- does not require authentication of server or client
- does not exchange keys
- Details omitted

Creating the "Master" Secret WILLIAM SMARY The master secret is a one-time (per session)
 48-byte (= 16+16+16) value Parameters • the pre-master secret S has previously been communicated using RSA or D-H - the client nonce $R_{\rm c}$. the server nonce R_s Computation: K = MD5 (S | SHA-1("A" | S | R_c | R_s)) | MD5 (S | SHA-1("BB" | S | R_c | R_s)) | MD5 (S | SHA-1("CCC" | S | R_c | R_s))

Cryptographic Parameters WILLIAM Generated from the master secret K Rc Rs Values to be generated client authentication and encryption keys server authentication and encryption keys client encryption IV server encryption IV

Alert Protocol Examples WILLIAM SMARY

- Type 1: Fatal_Alert
 - ex.: Unexpected_Message, Bad_MAC, etc.
 - connection is immediately terminated
- Type 2: Warning
 - ex.: No_Certificate, Close_Notify

41

Summary SSL is the de facto authentication/ encryption protocol standard for HTTP becoming popular for many other protocols as well Allows negotiation of cryptographic methods and parameters