@INPROCEEDINGS {qun_dcoss06,
	author = {Haodong Wang and Qun Li},
	booktitle = {{IEEE} International Conference on Distributed Computing in Sensor Systems ({DCOSS}), {LNCS} 4026},
	PAGES = {305--320},
	TITLE = {Distributed User Access Control in Sensor Networks},
	Address ={San Francisco, {CA}},
	Month={June},
	YEAR = {2006}
	}

Abstract 

User access control in sensor networks defines a process of granting 
user the access right to the information and resources. It is essential 
for the future real sensor network deployment in which sensors may 
provide users with different services in terms of data and resource 
access. A centralized access control mechanism requires base station 
to be involved whenever a user requests to get authenticated and 
access the information stored in the sensor node, which is 
inefficient, not scalable, and is exposed to many potential attacks 
along the long communication path. In this paper, we propose a 
distributed user access control under a realistic adversary model 
in which sensors can be compromised and user may collude. We split 
the access control into local authentication conducted by the sensors 
physically close to the user, and a light remote authentication based 
on the endorsement of the local sensors. Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC), a public key cryptography scheme, is used for local 
authentication. We implement the access control protocols on a testbed 
of TelosB motes. Our analysis and experimental results show that our 
scheme is feasible for real access control requirement.